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 Threat management of water distribution systems is essential for protecting 
consumers. In a contamination event, different strategies may be implemented to protect 
public health, including flushing the system through opening hydrants or isolating the 
contaminant by manipulating valves. To select the most effective options for responding 
to a contamination threat, the location and loading profile of the source of the 
contaminant should be considered.  These characteristics can be identified by utilizing 
water quality data from sensors that have been strategically placed in a water distribution 
system. A simulation-optimization approach is described here to solve the inverse 
problem of source characterization, by coupling an evolutionary computation-based 
search with a water distribution system model.  The solution of this problem may reveal, 
however, that a set of non-unique sources exists, where sources with significantly 
different locations and loading patterns produce similar concentration profiles at sensors. 
The problem of non-uniqueness should be addressed to prevent the misidentification of a 
contaminant source and improve response planning.  This paper aims to address the 
problem of non-uniqueness through the use of Niched Co-Evolution Strategies (NCES). 
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NCES is an evolutionary algorithm designed to identify a specified number of 
alternative solutions that are maximally different in their decision vectors, which are 
source characteristics for the water distribution problem. NCES is applied to determine 
the extent of non-uniqueness in source characterization for a virtual city, Mesopolis, 
with a population of approximately 150,000 residents. Results indicate that NCES 
successfully identifies non-uniqueness in source characterization and provides 
alternative sources of contamination.  The solutions found by NCES assist in making 
decisions about response actions.  Once alternative sources are identified, each source 
can be modeled to determine where the vulnerable areas of the system are, indicating the 
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Water Distribution Systems (WDS) are comprised of several components: pipes, 
storage tanks, pump stations, water treatment plants, and pipes.  Due to the wide range of 
access points, WDS are considered to be vulnerable to accidental outbreaks of bacteria 
and intentional injection of harmful contaminants.  A contaminant can enter the system 
through any one of the components if precautions have not been taken to ensure their 
security.   Since WDS provide communities with clean drinking water, it is essential to 
protect the public should a contamination event occur.  During a contamination event, 
decision makers, such as city or utility managers, should select effective mitigation 
strategies to protect public health.  Several measures can be taken to minimize 
consequences if a contaminant is introduced to the system: open fire hydrants to release 
water; close or open valves to isolate the contaminant; increase chlorine concentration in 
water; and notify consumers to stop or limit usage of water.  Knowledge about the 
location and timing of the source of contamination can provide the necessary insight to 
select the most effective decision for implementing response actions.  The source 
characterization can be performed using data from sensor networks placed in the WDS, 
which provide information about the contaminant as it moves through the system, 
including the observed contamination profile data.   
Data observed from a sensor network can be used to solve for the initial 
characteristics of a contamination event by posing source identification as an inverse  
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management. 
 2 
problem.  The inverse problem can be solved by coupling a simulation model with an 
optimization method; however, due to the ill-posed nature of inverse problems, a set of 
solutions may exist that match the observed data, while demonstrating significantly 
different source characteristics.  This issue, known as non-uniqueness, may occur due to 
lack of sufficient data or the presence of error in the data.  If not properly addressed, 
non-uniqueness in a source identification problem may lead to faulty identification of the 
location of the source, and response actions that are based on misidentifications may fail 
to protect public health.  While optimization methodologies have been developed to 
solve the source identification problem, the issue of non-uniqueness has been addressed 
to only a limited extent. The goal of this research is to develop a method that addresses 
non-uniqueness in source identification for water distribution contamination events 
through refinement and application of an evolutionary computation-based method, 













2.1 Water Distribution System Security 
 
Water systems are classified as critical infrastructure by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).  Critical infrastructure is a sector that is vulnerable to attacks 
that can lead to a large amount of illnesses and casualties and/or disruptions in critical 
services to the public.  Because water systems are considered to be critical, there should 
be extensive planning and preparation on behalf of the government or managing entities 
to protect the public.  The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act of 2002) outlines the requirements for preparing 
for water related terrorism.  Through this act, the United States Environment Protection 
Agency (EPA) is required “to conduct assessments of their vulnerabilities to terrorist 
attack or other intentional acts and to defend against adversarial actions that might 
substantially disrupt the ability of a system to provide a safe and reliable supply of 
drinking water” for water systems with 3,300 or more customers (Public Health Security 
2002). There are two main types of water security events: accidental and intentional.  
Accidental events include biological/parasitic outbreaks, chemical spills, and natural 
disasters.  In 1993, the city of Milwaukee experienced a cryptosporidium outbreak in the 
water distribution system after heavy rains.  The contaminant caused over 400,000 
people to become ill and 104 deaths (Mac Kenzie et al. 2004).  Intentional attacks can be 
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in the form of biological/chemical contamination, damage to physical infrastructure, and 
computer system attack. 
Throughout history, various forms of biological and chemical attacks have been 
witnessed during times of war, such as poisoning water wells.  In Rome in 2002, a group 
of terrorists planned to introduce cyanide to the city’s WDS during a festival.  
Fortunately, the attack was foiled by security personnel before anyone was harmed.  
Damage to physical infrastructure, through, for example, bombing a water treatment 
plant, pump station, or water storage facility, would greatly impair a city’s ability to 
deliver safe drinking water for consumption and fire-fighting capabilities.  An attack on 
a computer system that controls the daily operations of a water utility is also considered 
to be a terrorist attack that could harm the public.  It is commonly known that the 
terrorist group Al Qaeda considers water as an option to cause terrorism (Kroll 2006).  
Anthrax and cholera are among many bacteria, viruses, and bio toxins that survive in 
water and have the potential to harm consumers (Clark and Deininger 2000).   
 
2.2 Source Identification 
 
Source identification is a problem that utilizes data, often from a sensor network, 
to solve for the source of contamination once an event has occurred.  Sensor data 
consists of the concentration profile (concentration over time) of a contaminant.  For the 
source identification problem, the solution is comprised of the location of the source, the 
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start time of contamination, and the contaminant loading profile.  The optimization 
problem is defined in Equation (1) as: 
 






where 𝐸 is the error, 𝑐𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑(𝑡) is the predicted contaminant concentration, and 𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑏𝑠(𝑡) is 
the observed contaminant concentration. The time step is 𝑡 and 𝑖 is the node index of a 
water quality sensor.  The specified number of time steps is T and the number of sensors 
in the network is N.  The difference between the predicted and observed contamination 
profile is calculated for all sensors in the system at each simulated time step.  The 
decision variables for this problem are the contaminant loading profile, M; the 











3. SOLUTION APPROACH 
 
3.1 Evolutionary Computation for Source Identification 
 
The problem of source identification can be approached as an inverse problem, 
where the output of a model is used to identify input parameters.  One approach to solve 
an inverse problem is to use a simulation-optimization approach (Fig. 1).   
 
 
Figure 1. Source Identification as an Inverse Problem. 
 
The problem of source identification has been addressed through both linear and 
non-linear programming, regression trees, logistic regression, and Evolutionary 
Computation (EC) methods.  Van Bloemen Waanders et al. (2003) approach the source 
identification problem using non-linear programming and gradient based methods.  They 
use a convection-diffusion approach to the source inversion problem and solve the 
problem using several different gradient based methods.  Laird et al. (2005) approach the 
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inverse problem using an origin tracking method through non-linear programming.  The 
goal of this methodology is to decrease the complexity of the problem, while continuing 
to identify realistic sources of contamination.  Guan et al. (2006) describes an algorithm 
that utilizes simulation-optimization and a reduced gradient method (RGM) to solve the 
source identification problem.  Their use of RGM aims to reduce the computation time 
of the simulation-optimization process.  Guan et al. (2006) also examined the effect of 
error in sensor data on the algorithms ability to correctly identify a source.  They found 
that the algorithm could still correctly identify a source, but it was not able to accurately 
define the release history.  Preis and Ostfeld (2006) utilized tree based methods to solve 
the source identification problem.  Model trees are calibrated by using EPANET and 
linear trees are constructed to solve for source characteristics.  Linear programming is 
used on both trees to solve the inverse problem.  Liu et al. (2008) presents a new method 
to reduce the search space in solving the source identification problem.  Logistic 
regression is used to assign a probability of a given node being the source to each node 
in the system.  A local search is then performed around nodes with a high probability of 
being a source.   
The research presented in this thesis uses evolutionary computation (EC) within a 
simulation-optimization framework to solve the source identification problem.  EC is an 
optimization approach based on the theory of natural selection, where a population of 
individuals represents potential solutions to a problem and converges to nearly global 
optima over repeated iteration of genetic operators, including selection and mutation 
(Rechenberg 1973, Schwefel 1981, and Schwefel 1995).   Genes (the decision variables) 
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make up the individual (the solution).  Evolution Strategies (ES) and Genetic Algorithms 
(GA) are common forms of EC, where ES uses mutation as its primary operator and GA 
uses crossover and mutation as operators.  Preis and Ostfeld (2007) describe the use of a 
GA in the source identification simulation-optimization problem.  The use of a GA 
allows for more exploration of possible solutions as opposed to non-EC methods.  GAs 
are also better equipped to solve large network problems more efficiently.    
Zechman and Ranjithan (2009) describe an ES approach to characterize sources 
of contamination during a WDS event.  For the source identification problem, ES is the 
optimizer applied to minimize the difference between the simulated contaminant and the 
observed contaminant concentration by adjusting decision variables, which represent the 
location, loading profile, and timing of contaminant release.  For a small WDS, a 
significant amount of non-uniqueness was revealed in the identification of centrally-
located sources. 
 
3.2 Modeling-to-Generate Alternatives 
 
One approach to address non-uniqueness that is inherent in the source 
identification problem is the Modeling-to-Generate Alternatives (MGA) modeling 
methodology.  MGA was first developed as a method to assist human decision making 
through mathematical programming (Brill 1979).  Alternatives generation is beneficial to 
a problem containing non-uniqueness because other possible solutions are identified; 
therefore addressing the problem by providing multiple solutions.  Alternative solutions 
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should have similar objective values and be maximally different in their decisions.  An 
original optimization problem can be represented in Equations (2) and (3) as: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑍 = 𝑓(𝑋) (2) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑔𝑖(𝑋) ≥ 𝑏𝑖   𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑀 (3) 
 
where 𝑍 is the objective function and X is a vector representing the decision variables.  
Equation (3) represents a set of constraints on the problem.  Optimization of Equation 
(1) yields Z* as the best solution and X* as the corresponding decisions.  A set of 
alternatives is generated using the following model, represented as Equations (4), (5), 
and (6): 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐷 = 𝑑(𝑋,𝑋∗) (4) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑓(𝑋) ≥ 𝑇(𝑍∗) (5) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑔𝑖(𝑋) ≥ 𝑏𝑖   𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑀 (6) 
 
where 𝐷 represents the difference between decision vectors X and X*.  An allowable 
relaxation in the objective Z* is represented by the target T, which allows for exploration 
of different decisions.  Though this relaxation encourages inferior solutions, nearly 
optimal solutions may be considered as viable options in decision making.  For the 
problem of non-uniqueness, MGA will identify other good, but different solutions to a 
problem containing non-uniqueness.  The amount of difference among the alternatives 
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can indicate the level of non-uniqueness in the problem.  For example, a large amount of 
difference between alternatives may indicate a high degree of non-uniqueness; while a 
small difference indicates that the problem may be unique. 
 
3.3 Evolutionary Computation for Generating Alternatives 
 
One implementation of MGA was performed using genetic algorithms to 
generate alternatives and was presented by Harrell and Ranjithan (2003) for a detention 
pond design problem.  Rather than specifying a difference function to find alternatives, 
the problem objectives and constraints were adjusted for different scenarios to find 
alternative solutions.  Allowing components of the problem to be flexible, such as land 
use, different solutions were derived with lower costs.  Incorporating different 
approaches to a problem can lead to the identification of many different, but good, 
solutions. 
Niching algorithms have also been used for generating alternatives.  Traditional 
niching methods encourage solutions to be found with similar objective values but 
different decisions compared with an optimal solution.  Three popular niching methods 
include clearing, crowding, and sharing.  In these traditional niching methods, several 
parameters must be defined to guide the search (Mahfoud 1995; Singh and Deb 2006).  
To avoid setting parameters, other methods can be adopted to generate alternatives.  A 
Genetic Algorithm for Modeling-to-Generate Alternatives (GAMGA) was explored by 
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Loughlin et al. (2001).  GAMGA used a genetic algorithm with the maximal difference 
function to generate alternatives. 
Zechman and Ranjithan (2004) presented the Evolutionary Algorithm to 
Generate Alternatives (EAGA) to explore complex engineering problems.  EAGA uses 
multiple subpopulations to solve for good solutions with maximally different decisions, 
where each subpopulation converges to one alternative solution.  EAGA operators 
primarily include binary tournament selection, mutation, and crossover, which are 
executed separately within each subpopulation.  Zechman and Ranjithan (2007) applied 
EAGA for a water resources problem to generate alternative designs. 
 
3.4 Niched Co-Evolution Strategies 
 
Zechman et al. (2006) extended EAGA to an ES-based implementation, Niched 
Co-Evolution Strategies (NCES), and applied the algorithm for source identification in 
groundwater pollution.  NCES utilizes ES optimization and the MGA modeling 
approach to generate alternatives.  NCES uses a set of subpopulations, where the first 
subpopulation searches for the best solution to the original optimization problem, and 
secondary subpopulations search for maximally different alternatives.  The relaxation 
used for deriving alternative solutions is based on the fitness of the best solution in the 
first subpopulation.  Secondary subpopulations are guided to different areas of the 
decision space by a selection mechanism that encourages solutions based on a difference 
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function and satisfaction of the objective function target.  NCES uses the same 
evolutionary operators for all subpopulations in the search for alternatives.   
 
3.4.1 Difference Calculation 
 
The difference function is based on the location of each subpopulation and how 
close one subpopulation is to all subpopulations.  The difference function for each 
individual is calculated as the minimum Euclidean distance to the centroids of all other 
subpopulations.    The difference function (𝐷𝑘,𝑝) represents the centroid calculation and 
is defined in Equations (7) and (8) as: 
 
𝐷𝑘,𝑝 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 �∑ 𝑑�𝑋𝑘,𝑝,𝑋𝑗,𝑞�𝐾𝑗=1
𝐾
; 𝑞 = 1, … ,𝑃, 𝑞 ≠ 𝑝� (7) 
𝐸𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  �(𝑥2 − 𝑥1)2 + (𝑦2 − 𝑦1)2 (8) 
 
where 𝑑�𝑋𝑘,𝑝,𝑋𝑗,𝑞� is the Euclidian distance between the centroids of two 
subpopulations 𝑋𝑘,𝑝 and 𝑋𝑗,𝑞, 𝐾 is the number of individuals in a subpopulation, and 𝑃 
is the number of subpopulations (Zechman et al. 2006).  The Euclidean distance in 





3.4.2 Search Operators 
 
NCES utilizes two main search operators: mutation and selection.  These 
operators search the decision space for different solutions that meet the constraints of the 
optimization problem.  The mutation operator makes changes in the decisions variables 
based on probability and produces λ new individuals in each subpopulation.  The 
mutation is performed on the genes by randomly sampling from a normal distribution 
based on the current values of the genes, where the mean is the current value.  The 
standard deviation is determined for all subpopulations and is set as the mutation 
parameter.  For NCES, the mutation operator is adaptive.  In adaptive mutation, the 
standard deviation is determined while the search is occurring and is adjusted using a 
separate normal distribution to mutate the mutation parameter. 
The main selection operators are ranking selection and Elitist Graduated Over-
Selection (EGOS) (Fernandez and Evett 1997).  Ranking involves sorting the solutions 
from best to worst based on their fitness values.  The ranking process in NCES is 
different depending on the subpopulation.  In the first subpopulation, selection is based 
solely on fitness values.  Individuals are ranked from best fitness to worst fitness and the 
best μ individuals are selected to survive for the next generation.  In subsequent 
populations, selection depends on feasibility.  Feasible individuals meet the target value 
set by the first subpopulation.  The feasible individuals are first ranked from maximally 
different to least different.  Infeasible individuals are ranked from most different to least 
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different and are ranked below all feasible individuals.  The best μ individuals survive to 
the next generation (Schwefel 1995).   
EGOS is used to increase the chance that highly fit solutions are selected in each 
subpopulation.  The step size (upper quantile) is set by the user at the beginning of the 
search.  After individuals are ranked, a set of individuals are placed into a pool of 
candidates.  The size of the pool is specified as the upper quantile. Each individual in 
this pool has an equal probability to be selected, and one individual is randomly selected 
to survive to the next generation.  The solution that is selected is placed back into the 
pool, and the size of the pool is increased by adding the next individual from the ranked 
list.  Individuals are selected from the increasing pool of candidates until the population 
for next generation has been developed.  This increases the selection pressure because 
highly ranked individuals have more opportunities to be selected than poorly ranked 
individuals, and duplicates of highly fit solutions are likely to be copied into the next 
generation. 
 
3.4.3 Algorithmic Steps 
 
The algorithmic steps as defined by Zechman et al. (2006) are listed below: 
 
 Step 1. Initialize a population with P subpopulations, each of size μ, where P is the 
number of alternatives the algorithm is searching for and μ is the number of individuals 
in each subpopulation.  Each subpopulation is represented by the index SPp (p=1,…,P).  
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SP1, the first subpopulation, searches for the best solution with respect to the objective 
function. SPp≠1, the subsequent subpopulations, search for alternative solutions.   
 
Step 2. Apply adaptive mutation to all subpopulations, yielding λ new individuals in 
each subpopulation. 
 
Step 3. Evaluate the fitness of each individual in μ + λ in the first subpopulation and 
select the best individual with respect to fitness using Equation (2).  The fitness of the 
best individual is relaxed by the target T for the generation of alternatives in the 
subsequent subpopulations using Equation (5). 
 
Step 4. In the subsequent subpopulations (SPp≠1), evaluate the fitness of each individual 
in μ + λ.  The fitness of each individual is designated as feasible if it meets the target 
constraint in Equation (5).  Individuals not meeting the target constraint are designated 
as infeasible. 
 
Step 5. Calculate the difference Dk,p for all individuals in the subsequent populations 
(SPp≠1) using Equation (7).   
 
Step 6. Apply the ranking and EGOS selection to all subpopulations.   
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Step 7. Check termination criteria (e.g. number of generations).  If met, stop.  Otherwise 






















4. CASE STUDY: MESOPOLIS 
 
4.1 Virtual City of Mesopolis 
 
 The virtual city of Mesopolis was designed by Brumbelow et al. (2007) to model 
realistic events in WDS without compromising the water security of actual cities.  
Mesopolis is a city of approximately 150,000 residents and includes a naval base, 
university, urban and suburban housing throughout the system, an industrial area, an 
airport, and commercial areas.  Sources of contamination were chosen based on a 
vulnerability analysis by Zechman et al. (2011).  An original source is required to 
acquire the sensor data needed to use NCES for the identification of sources.  Fig. 2 
shows the locations of the sources of contamination tested for NCES.  A conservative 
contaminant was placed in the system at hour seven with a load of 60 mg/min for three 
hours, as shown in the loading profile in Fig. 2. The total simulation time for these 
contamination events was 72 hours; however, only the first 24 hours of data is shown 
(remaining data provides no important information).  All simulations were performed 
using EPANET, a modeling package provided by the EPA to simulation events in a 




Figure 2. (a) Source Locations in Mesopolis with (b) Contaminant Loading Profile. 
 
4.2 Sensor Network Design 
 
 Several different water quality sensor networks were designed for Mesopolis.  
The number of sensors varied from three to ten and sensors were strategically placed in 
the system.  For the three sensor network (Fig. 3a), the sensors were placed along water 
mains, tanks, and pump stations.  These high flow areas were selected because of their 
ability to provide large amounts of water to populated areas of Mesopolis.  Other sensors 
were added to the initial network to provide additional coverage of vulnerable areas.  































Figure 3. Sensor Networks in Mesopolis. (a) Three Sensors and (b) Five Sensors. 
 
4.3 Results and Discussion 
 
NCES was tested for three source and sensor network ensembles: source 1 and 
sensor network ABC, source 1 and sensor network ABCDE, and source 2 and sensor 
network ABC.  The performance of the algorithm and the results of each ensemble tested 













4.3.1 Algorithm Performance 
 
 The algorithmic parameters used when testing NCES for Mesopolis are shown in 
Table 1.  These values were selected after many trials using different values.  The 
population size is fairly large due to the large amount of potential solutions in 
Mesopolis.  Terminal nodes within the WDS were not considered; only intermediate 
nodes were considered in the search for sources of contamination.  For Mesopolis, 
NCES searched for three alternatives and therefore used three subpopulations.  Fig. 4 
shows three graphs representing the convergence of the objective function (error value) 
while NCES was operating.  The convergence shows that the first alternative (the 
optimal solution) experienced small changes as it converged to the best solution, which 
is to be expected by using the adaptive mutation.  The subsequent alternatives also 
followed typical ES convergence.  The movements of the average objective, shown in 
red in Fig 4., exist due to changes in feasibility cause strong mutations.  Once the 
majority of the subpopulation becomes feasible (they meet the target value), the 
mutation operator changes the individuals to maximize the distance between the other 
subpopulations.  The convergence graphs show that NCES is co-evolving by making 






Table 1. NCES Parameters for Mesopolis 
Algorithmic Parameter Value 
Number of Subpopulations 3 
Number of Generations 300 
Population Size μ 400 
Mutated Individuals λ 400 
Step Size (Upper Quantile) 80 























Objective of Alternative 1
















Objective of Alternative 2
Average Objective Best Objective Target
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Figure 4 continued.  
 
 NCES uses a Java framework coupled with the WDS modeling package, 
EPANET.  The parameters shown in Table 1 and the computation time of approximately 
83 days on an average desktop computer reflect the need to have a large number of 
individuals generated to search Mesopolis.  To reduce the computation time, NCES was 
executed on a computer cluster containing eleven nodes with two 2.2 GHz processors, 
four GB RAM, and 80 GB HD per node (Mahinthakumar et al. 2006).  Using 
parallelized versions of the Java framework and EPANET, the computation time for one 
optimization trial using the settings in Table 1 was reduced to approximately seven 
hours. 
 Table 2 shows a summary of the results found by NCES for three different 
source and sensor network combinations in Mesopolis.  Each scenario was executed for 
20 trials.  The algorithm found results that yielded low error values for all combinations.  
Good alternatives are identified as solutions with non-zero readings at the sensor that 
















Objective of Alternative 3
Average Objective Best Objective Target
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concentration profiles do not exactly match the observations; good solutions can be 
further ranked based on the value of the error function.  The error value must be 
evaluated while looking at the different between the concentration profiles to determine 
if the error value is good or not.  In general, good sets of solutions matched 
concentration profiles relatively well.  In comparing the scenarios with Source 1 and 
sensor networks ABC and ABCDE, there is little difference in the error value and the 
number of trials that identified good alternatives.  Even though two sensors were added 
to network ABC, these new sensors did not provide any new information and therefore 
did not improve the search for good alternatives.  In comparing Source 1 and Source 2 
with the same sensor network ABC, there is a difference in the error value and the 
number of trials that identified good alternatives.  Source 2 error values were lower on 
average and more good alternatives were identified.  This is most likely due to Source 
2’s proximity to Sensor C, the only sensor that received non-zero concentration values 
for Source 2.  The distance among the alternatives, however, is smaller than the distance 
among the alternatives found for Source 1.  The following sub-sections further 
investigate the results of the three scenarios.   
 
Table 2. Summary of NCES Results as Demonstrated for Mesopolis 
Ensembles/Parameters 
Source 1 and 
Sensor Network 
ABC 
Source 1 and 
Sensor Network 
ABCDE 
Source 2 and 
Sensor Network 
ABC 
Average Error (mg2/L2) 1.2 1.5 0.5 
Number of Trials that 
Identified Good Alternatives 9 9 13 
Average Distance Between 
Alternatives in Best Trial (feet) 5,175 13,478 4,471 
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4.3.2 Source 1 and Sensor Network ABC 
 
 Source 1 was placed on the western side of Mesopolis along a high flow water 
main.  Nine trials, of the 20 tested, identified three good alternatives.  A good alternative 
is defined as a non-zero reading at a minimum of one of the sensors in the network.  This 
means that the alternative sources identified did contain a loading profile that yielded 
sensor data.  The average error for all 20 trials was 1.2 mg2/L2.  Figs. 5 and 6 show the 
location and loading profile, with ensuing sensor data, for each alternative in the best 
trial of the 20 trials.  Sensor A is the only sensor that received data and is therefore the 
only concentration profile shown; sensors B and C had zero concentration values.  The 
average Euclidian distance between the alternatives is 5,175 feet.  The error values are 
0.0, 1.7, and 0.8 mg2/L2 for alternatives 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
For this representative solution, the first alternative correctly identified Source 1 
as the true source of contamination.  Two other alternatives were successfully generated 
with similar error values and different locations.  The loading profiles in Fig. 6 show 
minimal difference in the start time and duration and a large difference in the amount of 
contaminant entering the system.  The concentration profiles at Sensor A show the 
observed sensor data in black marks and the predicted sensor data in solid, colored lines.  
The sensor data matches exactly for the first alternative, while the sensor data closely 
matches for the subsequent alternatives.  The differences in the decision variables 
(location and amount of loading) that yield similar objective values indicate that good 




Figure 5. Location of Alternatives Found for Source 1 and Sensor Network ABC. 
 
4.3.3 Source 1 and Sensor Network ABCDE 
 
 Similar to the first ensemble, NCES was executed for 20 trials and nine trials 
identified three good alternatives.  The average error was 1.5 mg2/L2 and the only sensor 
that received data was Sensor A.  Therefore, the addition of Sensors D and E did not 
provide any new information to assist in minimizing the error in the concentration 
profiles.  The average Euclidian distance between the alternatives is 13,478 feet.  Figs. 7 
and 8 show the location, loading profile, and sensor data for each alternative in the best 
trial of the 20 trials.  The error values for the best trial shown are 0.3, 0.4, and 0.4 mg2/L2 








Figure 6. Loading Profiles and Sensor Concentration Profiles for Alternatives Found for 
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Figure 7. Location of Alternatives Found for Source 1 and Sensor Network ABCDE. 
 
The third alternative identified the true source of contamination, Source 1, while 
the first and second alternatives identified different sources in their location and loading 
profile.  The loading profiles vary among the three alternatives, with the third alternative 
being different from the loading profile of the true source.  This difference contributes to 
the error value, due to a variation in the sensor data.  Identical to the first ensemble, the 
concentration profiles at Sensor A show the observed sensor data in black marks and the 
predicted sensor data in solid, colored lines.  The sensor data closely matches the 
observed sensor data for all alternatives generated, yielding low error values.  Again 
similar to the first ensemble, good alternatives were generated as indicated by the large 
difference in the decision variables with low error values, suggesting non-uniqueness 








Figure 8. Loading Profiles and Sensor Concentration Profiles for Alternatives Found for 




4.3.4 Source 2 and Sensor Network ABC 
 
The third combination utilized the smaller three sensor network ABC for a 
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trials identified three good alternatives, where “good” means the alternative source 
yielded non-zero readings at a sensor.  The average error was 0.5 mg2/L2 and the only 
sensor that received data was Sensor C.  Sensors A and B did not receive sensor data.  
The average Euclidian distance between the alternatives is 4,471 feet.  Figs. 9 and 10 
show the location, loading profile, and sensor data for each alternative in the best trial of 
the 20 trials.  For the best trial the error values are 0.0, 1.2, and 0.5 mg2/L2 for 
alternatives 1, 2, and 3, respectively.   
 
 







Figure 10. Loading Profiles and Sensor Concentration Profiles for Alternatives Found 




The first alternative correctly identified the true source, Source 2.  Alternatives 
two and three identified two different sources with strong variability in their loading 
profiles.  This difference among the loading profiles is to be expected due the varying 
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sensor data in black marks and the predicted sensor data in solid, colored lines.  There 
was no difference between the predicted and observed sensor data for alternative one and 
there was minimal difference for the subsequent alternatives.  The large difference 
among decision variables with similar objective values indicates that non-uniqueness is 



















5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Niched Co-Evolution Strategies is a method that combines the optimization of 
Evolution Strategies with a modeling approach to generate alternatives to address the 
problem of non-uniqueness in source identification.  NCES was executed for three 
source and sensor network ensembles in the virtual city of Mesopolis.  All three 
ensembles indicated that non-uniqueness was present in the system by identifying 
alternatives that were different in their loading profiles but produced sensor data that 
closely, and in some cases exactly, matched the observed sensor data.  One metric that 
can be used to determine the amount of non-uniqueness in the system is the distance 
calculation.  In general, a greater distance between alternatives indicates that there is 
strong non-uniqueness present in the system.  This conclusion is supported by the results 
shown in the previous sectiom.  From a management and WDS security standpoint, the 
presence of non-uniqueness suggests that more data should be collected to confidently 
identify the true source of contamination.  If more data cannot be acquired in a timely 
manner, NCES provides alternative source locations where response actions should be 
implemented to protect consumers.  NCES is a helpful tool for emergency managers and 
others responsible for WDS security.  Aside from addressing the problem of non-
uniqueness in source identification, NCES can be coupled with other modeling and 
optimization approaches to address a wide range of problems including adaptive source 
identification, sensor placement, and source identification using diverse sources of 
information.   
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While NCES can be extended to different algorithms for future studies, the 
algorithm can be improved to make the results more accurate and reduce the 
computational time.  Since computer technology is constantly updated, improvements 
for NCES may come in the form of algorithmic and hydraulic system changes.  Using a 
regular centroid calculation, as opposed to the weighted centroid calculation mentioned 
previously, may improve the identification of sources that are geographically distant. 
Sensor placement algorithms can be executed for Mesopolis to improve the value of the 
data that is collected. One hydraulic system adjustment that could be made to improve 
NCES’s ability to perform in a more practical situation is to include more realistic 
sensors that better reflect current technology.  For this research, it was assumed that all 
sensors were perfect and provided accurate data.  Realistically, sensors occasionally 
provide false readings or incomplete readings.  There is research in the area of using 
imperfect sensor data for source identification that could be incorporated for future work 
with NCES (Preis and Ostfeld 2008).   
Since Mesopolis is such a large system with many possible nodes, it could be of 
benefit to use a method to decrease the search space for NCES.  The search space cannot 
be reduced too much, though, because the goal of NCES is to search different areas of 
the decision space to find alternative solutions.  Liu et al. (2008) explores the use of a 
local search to decrease the search space for the source identification problem, and this 
type of algorithm can be integrated as an initial step in NCES.  
NCES follows a long line of tools developed to aid in the decision making 
process.  Liebman (1976) defined the role of optimization in public sector decision 
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making as a tool to assist in the decision making process, rather than a single solution 
identifier.  Optimization and model methods should provide insight to a problem as 
opposed to delivering an answer.  Most problems in the public sector are classified as 
“wicked” and are difficult to solve using traditional methods.  Brill’s development of 
MGA (1979) was a significant step in the direction of providing insight to a problem 
instead of simply solving the problem.   NCES is the next step in coupling the modeling 
approach of MGA with optimization methods to provide information about a problem.  
For example, in the source identification problem, NCES indicates if non-uniqueness is 
present in a problem and the amount of non-uniqueness in the problem.  Though NCES 
provides solutions in the form of alternatives, these alternatives are not the final answer.  
They merely show that there are several possible areas of contamination and suggest that 
more data is needed to identify the true source or a different respond strategy is needed 
to protect the public from any of the possible sources.   
At this time, NCES has been applied to the technical model of the hydraulic 
system, while ignoring the dynamic interactions of consumers and utility operators that 
could change the propagation of the contaminant plume.  Another area of future work for 
NCES is incorporating the social aspects of a contamination event with the technical 
system through a socio-technical system analysis approach.  Research is already 
underway in this field (Zechman 2011).  Using NCES to generate alternatives instead of 
finding one outcome can provide an immense amount of insight for socio-technical 
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